The Anatomy of College Tuition by Archibald, Robert B & Feldman, David H
W&M ScholarWorks 
Arts & Sciences Articles Arts and Sciences 
4-5-2012 
The Anatomy of College Tuition 
Robert B. Archibald 
College of William and Mary, rbarch@wm.edu 
David H. Feldman 
College of William and Mary, dhfeld@wm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/aspubs 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Archibald, Robert B. and Feldman, David H., The Anatomy of College Tuition (2012). American Council on 
Education. 
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/aspubs/869 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts and Sciences at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Articles by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more 
information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
The Anatomy of 
College Tuition
by Robert B. Archibald and David H. Feldman
The Anatomy of College Tuition 1
The increasing cost of attending a col-lege or university is a concern that resonates with families at all income 
levels and with people whose views span 
the political spectrum. President Obama 
recently gathered a group of college presi-
dents and leaders in higher education to 
discuss the problem and possible solutions. 
Congressional hearings focused on college 
tuition are a regular feature of the political 
landscape. Op-ed writers have taken on high 
tuition and fees with increasing frequency 
and considerable ferocity. And the Occupy 
movement lists high levels of student debt—
a corollary of high price—as one of the 
myriad ills it opposes. If there is anything 
approaching a consensus opinion in Ameri-
can life today, it is the need to do something 
about the high price of college. 
 Why does college cost so much? Our 
objective in this short essay, based on our 
book, Why Does College Cost So Much?, 
is to give a summary of the evidence so 
readers will understand the forces driving 
tuition. This information is a crucial 
component of any policy discussion on 
the cost of higher education. 
 The conversation about the rising cost 
of a college education often begins from the 
premise that institutions as well as systems 
of higher education are dysfunctional. 
Holding up a magnifying glass to the 
industry might uncover many imperfections. 
But without proper context that information 
can be quite misleading. 
 There is value in placing higher 
education firmly within the industrial 
structure of the American economy and the 
economic history of the past century, context 
that is often missing from contemporary 
discussions about higher education. Once 
you embed higher education within the 
broader economy, you begin to see how the 
forces of technological change that have 
reshaped the global economy have had a 
profound impact on the cost structure of 
colleges and universities as well as on how 
they set tuition.
 This difference in approach is not an 
academic exercise—too much is at stake. 
Higher education is an engine of innovation, 
economic growth, and social progress. 
For most students with the background to 
succeed in college, access to high-quality 
postsecondary education remains the single 
most important investment they can make. 
 Crafting a constructive public policy 
toward a complex sector like higher 
education requires a clear understanding 
of the basic forces tugging on the industry. 
Our framework provides a good basis 
for understanding how those forces have 
created the system as it exists, and how 
we might restructure incentives to make 
it work better. Overheated rhetoric about 
the supposed ills and inefficiency of higher 
education often leads to counterproductive 
policy ideas that confuse symptoms 
with causes and that overestimate what 
government can do.
Is Higher Education Unusual?
College tuition tends to rise faster than the 
inflation rate. Some take this fact as prima 
facie evidence that something is deeply 
wrong with the behavior of colleges and 
universities. By contrast, our first reaction to 
this phenomenon is to ask, is it unusual? 
 The inflation rate is a weighted average 
of the price changes of products that make 
up the price index. In any given year many 
items will go up in price more rapidly than 
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the average while others will experience 
slower price growth. Some goods may even 
decline in price. But the data show that the 
price of higher education consistently rises 
more rapidly than inflation. Is this unusual? 
Are there other industries with similar price 
behavior? 
 Suppose we live in a world in which 
there is a 50/50 chance in any given year 
that the price of a particular good or 
service will go up faster than the overall 
inflation rate. In this world, as the years 
go by most items would increase in price 
faster than average roughly half of the time. 
Alternatively, we might live in a world in 
which the prices of some items usually 
increase more than average, and to balance 
things out some others usually increase less 
rapidly than average. If we live in the first 
world, the price behavior of college tuition 
would appear very odd. If we live in the 
second world, higher education would not 
be so unusual. 
 Figure A details price changes over 
the period 1947–2010 for 69 products that 
are part of the price index for personal 
consumption expenditure.1 These goods 
and services include categories like new 
cars, jewelry and watches, electricity, life 
insurance, and higher education. We can use 
the 64 annual price changes from 1947 to 
2010 to count the number of times the price 
of a particular product rose more rapidly 
than the overall index. The chart orders the 
69 industries from left to right by how many 
times its price increased faster than the 
overall inflation rate. 
 On the left of the diagram, we have two 
industries (1 and 2) whose price increase 
only exceeded the overall inflation rate in 
four of the 64 years. At the other extreme, 
we have one product whose annual price 
Figure A.  number of Years with a Percentage Price Increase 
Exceeding the Inflation Rate, 1947–2010
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increase exceeded the overall inflation rate 
in 62 of the 64 years. 
 This evidence contains two big 
messages. First, there are a lot of industries 
whose price increases have consistently 
exceeded the overall inflation rate. Higher 
education, whose price index increased 
more rapidly than the overall price index 
in 52 of the 64 years, is not unique. It’s not 
even particularly unusual. Second, the group 
of industries whose prices consistently rise 
more rapidly than overall inflation is not a 
random selection from the 69. To see this, 
we have colored the service industries, such 
as dental services, with a red diamond, non-
durable goods, such as food, with a black 
square, and durable goods, such as new 
automobiles, with a pink triangle. Services 
are much more likely than goods to have 
price increases that exceed the average price 
increase. Non-durable goods are less likely 
to see price increases consistently higher 
than the inflation rate. And durable goods 
tend to experience price increases that 
consistently fall below the inflation rate. 
 This evidence seems quite clear. We 
cannot explain the anatomy of college 
tuition just by dissecting the budgets of 
American colleges and universities. We 
must look beyond higher education to 
evaluate changes in the economy that affect 
both higher education and other services. 
What Does It Cost to Provide 
Higher Education?
Colleges and universities spend a certain 
amount per student to provide educational 
services. Changes in this cost are the most 
important driver of tuition—or college price—
over long periods of time. However, there are 
other forces that affect tuition independent 
of changes in the costs schools incur. Higher 
education is a heavily subsidized activity. 
States support their public institutions 
Figure B. Index of Real Higher Education Costs (1970=1), 1948–2008
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with direct appropriations that allow 
schools to charge a price that is less than 
cost. For private universities, and for some 
public institutions as well, endowment 
income and private giving serve the same 
function. In addition, institutions discount 
tuition for some students, and this puts 
upward pressure 
on published 
tuition prices. We 
will address the 
effects of changes 
in subsidies and 
discounts on tuition 
later on in our 
argument. First we 
need to understand 
the long-term 
evolution of cost in 
this industry. 
 Figure B shows 
the evolution of 
the real cost of 
providing a higher 
education from 
1948–2008.2 The term “real” means cost 
numbers are adjusted for overall inflation. 
If the real cost of a year in college is rising 
over a period of time that means educational 
costs are growing more rapidly than the 
inflation rate. If real costs are falling, then 
higher education costs are growing less 
rapidly than inflation. We should also note 
“educational costs” do not include auxiliary 
services like room and board.
 Taking a broad look at the data, we can 
see three separate time periods: (1) From 
the start of the data to the mid 1960s real 
higher education costs rose quite rapidly; 
(2) From the late 1960s until 1980 real higher 
education costs were flat and then declined 
slightly; and (3) From 1980 to the present, 
real higher education costs again began to 
rise more rapidly than overall inflation.
 Any serious explanation of rising 
higher education costs should encompass 
these three distinct episodes. A complete 
story must also contend with the fact that 
the generally upward trend of real higher 
education costs is very similar to the 
evolution of real prices for other services. 
The story of rising college cost is part of 
the larger story of technological change 
that has reshaped 
the American 
economy over the 
last century. Our 
technology story is 
a tripod with three 
strong legs.
Cost Disease: 
The first leg of 
the tripod is what 
economists call 
“cost disease.” 
Technological 
progress tends 
to reduce the 
amount of labor 
and other inputs 
required to produce a ton of steel or 
bushel of wheat. This growth in labor 
productivity is the reason we are better 
off than our grandparents. Manufacturing 
and agriculture have been the greatest 
beneficiaries of this kind of technological 
blessing. Any product or commodity that 
is fairly homogeneous or is made in an 
industrial setting is quite susceptible to this 
kind of cost-reducing productivity growth. 
 On the other hand, for many service 
industries productivity growth is much 
harder to achieve. To produce a haircut or 
a restaurant meal takes roughly the same 
amount of labor today that it did a half 
century ago. This is the “disease.” Cost-
reducing technological change does not 
benefit all industries equally. And personal 
services, such as haircuts and college 
classes, are the least blessed by labor-saving 
productivity growth. In these labor-intensive 
The story of rising college 
cost is part of the larger 
story of technological 
change that has reshaped 
the American economy 
over the last century.
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industries the time of the service provider is 
the service, and economizing on that time 
reduces the quality of the service. Yet these 
service industries hire from the same labor 
market and buy electricity from the same 
utilities as other industries. Any industry 
that experiences lower productivity growth 
than the national average will see its costs 
go up more rapidly than the overall inflation 
rate, and this has been the fate of most 
services over the past century.
 This fact does not mean services have 
become less affordable. To the extent 
productivity growth in other sectors is 
raising per capita national income, this 
growth supports rising spending on all 
goods and services. Cost disease is not the 
cause of affordability problems in higher 
education. As we will show later, affordability 
problems are driven more by changes 
in state subsidies and in the American 
distribution of income than by rising cost.
 Our standard measures of productivity 
are often misleading in most personal 
services. If you measure labor productivity 
by counting students taught per professor-
hour, we could 
easily raise labor 
productivity by 
doubling class size. 
But a discussion-
based freshman 
seminar with 15 
students is not 
made better by 
adding 15 more 
students, though 
it may be less 
costly. Meaningful 
productivity growth 
must at least 
preserve quality, which is why productivity 
measurement is so difficult in personal 
services.
 At present, students interacting directly 
with professors and other students in small 
groups remain a benchmark of quality in 
education. Ask any family if they want their 
son or daughter to learn in small group 
seminars taught by tenured professors, or 
if they prefer giant impersonal lectures or 
online chat rooms monitored by adjuncts 
who answer lots of email questions.
 We think most contemporary critics of 
higher education fail to credit the power of 
the cost disease argument in explaining the 
long evolution of higher education costs. 
The artisan nature of higher education 
explains much of this past experience. 
Distance education is the current hope 
for breaking the grip of cost disease and 
generating meaningful productivity growth 
in higher education. But as long as most 
people are convinced that quality programs 
rely on providing strong personal interaction 
between professors and students, college 
costs will tend to rise faster than the overall 
inflation rate. 
The Cost of Employing Highly Educated 
Service Providers: The second leg of our 
tripod is how technological forces have 
reshaped the U.S. 
labor market. 
Higher education, 
like many other 
personal services, 
relies on a highly 
educated work 
force. Roughly 
70 percent of the 
employees at a 
university hold 
at least a college 
degree. The 
figure for most 
manufacturing 
industries is much lower. If the gap in 
earnings widens between those who have a 
college degree and those who do not, that 
is another force acting to push up cost in 
Cost disease is not the 
cause of affordability 
problems in higher 
education.
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those personal services compared to other 
industries with less educated work forces.
 Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz 
of Harvard make a convincing case 
that the kind of 
technological 
innovations that 
have revolutionized 
the economy over 
the last century 
have raised the 
demand for people 
with ever more 
years of formal 
schooling. At the 
same time, the 
growth in the 
supply of that kind 
of labor began to slow in the late 1970s. In 
the race between the demand for educated 
labor and the supply, demand has won the 
latest round. The result is a rising earnings 
gap in favor of the college educated.
 Industries that rely on highly 
educated service providers have all faced 
comparatively higher labor costs starting 
in the 1980s. The cost pressure on higher 
education (and on other education-
intensive services) is comparative. If the 
gap in total compensation (salaries and 
benefits) between the highly educated and 
the less well-educated grows, then the cost 
of producing a service that uses highly 
educated labor must also grow. Colleges 
and universities also employ a lot of highly 
educated people outside of the classroom, 
and these people have many alternatives in 
the private sector.
The Standard of Care: Technological 
change does affect higher education directly, 
but the effect of innovation in many service 
industries tends not to be primarily of the 
labor saving and cost reducing kind that we 
have seen in manufacturing and agriculture. 
Instead of reducing the number of labor 
hours it takes to produce a class, new 
technologies alter what we teach and how 
we teach it. For example, students in science 
and technology fields must be familiar with 
current tools that 
define modern 
laboratories. These 
tools are much 
more expensive 
than the chalk 
and blackboard 
world of the past. 
Universities do 
not really have 
the option to use 
older but cheaper 
educational 
methods. 
 Just like modern medicine, colleges 
and universities must meet a standard of 
care. For higher education the standard 
of care is set by the labor market that will 
employ our graduates. As a consequence 
colleges and universities cannot choose to 
use technology the way other businesses do. 
Other industries only adopt new technology 
if it will improve the quality of the firm’s 
product or reduce the costs of producing 
the product. Colleges and universities have 
to adopt new practices and new technology 
even if doing so results in higher costs. 
 These curricular reforms actually lower 
labor productivity measured as students 
taught per professor-year. This raises cost. 
But if innovations like these also raise 
quality by better preparing students for the 
kinds of cognitive tasks that will define the 
labor market of the next 30 years, then these 
reforms may pay a handsome dividend.
Summary: Our three-part explanation of the 
technological forces that have transformed 
the entire economic landscape helps 
illuminate the 65 year evolution of higher 
education costs. Our story explains the long 
upward trend in cost, and it can also explain 
Universities do not 
really have the option to 
use older but cheaper 
educational methods.
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the pause and slight reversal during the 
1970s. 
 Technological progress is the driving 
engine behind cost disease. When it slows, 
cost disease loses steam. The period from 
1973 to roughly 1981 is sometimes called 
“the great productivity slowdown,” and not 
coincidentally, that is the decade in which 
higher education costs stopped rising. 
Technological progress again accelerated 
starting in the early 1980s, so the engine of 
cost disease revved again. In addition, the 
returns to a college degree that drives the 
costs of employing highly educated workers 
declined in the 1970s, but accelerated 
starting in the 1980s. The combination of 
these factors brought the increase in the 
real costs of providing higher education to 
a halt in the 1970s while causing them to 
accelerate again starting in 1980.
Alternative Views: 
The Dysfunction Narrative
In our story, the forces responsible for 
rising higher education costs are external 
and they are not 
specific to colleges 
and universities. 
There is an 
alternative view 
that paints a picture 
of a thoroughly 
dysfunctional 
higher education 
system. 
 The dysfunction 
narrative has many 
strands. 
Prestige. Prestige games are about positions 
in a pecking order, and no matter how good 
a school may be, there are still only 10 slots 
in the top 10. Prestige games are a form of 
positional arms race, and like all arms races 
they are potentially expensive and difficult 
to terminate. Prestige games can take many 
forms. Consider the competition for faculty 
stars. There are a limited number of faculty 
members who can really make a difference 
in a graduate program, and the competition 
for these stars could drive up their salaries. 
Equity considerations then cause schools 
to pass these higher salaries on to non-star 
faculty members as well, driving up costs. 
Students. There is also a competition 
for talented students, which begins with 
recruiting as schools spend money on glossy 
brochures, a savvy web presence, and a staff 
whose job is to sift through thousands of 
applications. The competition continues 
with amenities designed to lure students to 
campus to enjoy country club facilities. 
Faculty and Administration. Other 
accounts of dysfunctional colleges and 
universities focus on interest groups 
within the institution. The faculty and 
administration both take a beating in 
these accounts. High salaries for college 
presidents are sometimes noted. But 
most often a lax 
workplace culture 
is blamed for 
rising cost, and the 
system of tenure 
is the heart of that 
problem. 
As the story 
goes, faculty 
members armed 
with tenure 
redefine their role 
in the institution 
to encompass 
more research and less teaching while 
transferring other student-centered duties 
to professional administrators. In turn, 
administrators make the case for all kinds 
of new or expanded activities at colleges 
and universities. These activities include 
academic advising and career services, 
Colleges and universities 
have to adopt new 
practices and new 
technology even if doing 
so results in higher costs. 
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which used to be faculty responsibilities, as 
well as expanded regulatory compliance, 
new auxiliary services, and ever expanding 
information technology services. In part, 
some of this expansion of administration is 
related to the increase in student amenities 
caused by the prestige game. It is easy to 
find accounts that pin rising college costs on 
“administrative bloat.”
 The dysfunction stories have a 
superficial plausibility, but they do not do a 
good job of explaining the actual data.
 First, for the dysfunction arguments to 
explain rising cost they have to do more 
than illustrate ways in which colleges and 
universities might be inefficient. Like most 
large organizations, it’s easy to finger certain 
practices or incentives as sub-optimal. It’s 
much harder to show why inefficiency is 
rising dramatically and in ways that match 
the evidence on cost. We do not think 
universities are more inefficient than they 
were in the past. For example, the institution 
of tenure has been in decline for decades, 
especially at public institutions subject 
to bouts of budget cutting. Dysfunction 
stories also have a particular problem with 
the 1970s, when real higher education costs 
actually declined. Was there a burst of 
functionality in that decade?
 Second, almost all examples of 
dysfunction rely on practices at four-year 
institutions. The pathologies of prestige 
games and of faculty interested in polishing 
their research at the expense of teaching 
might be significant drivers of cost per 
student at four-year institutions, but two-year 
community colleges would not seem to be 
affected by these same ills. They tend to be 
non-residential, open-enrollment institutions 
focused on teaching where faculty members 
do little research. 
The Anatomy of College Tuition 9
 Figure C compares current fund 
expenditures at two- and four-year public 
institutions. The trajectory of cost is not 
identical in both, but they are very close.3 
Whatever one 
believes about 
the social value of 
faculty research, 
or the gold-plating 
of the college 
experience, these 
factors don’t explain 
the cost growth in 
two-year colleges. 
On the other hand, 
like their four-
year brethren, two-
year colleges have 
experienced very 
little productivity 
growth, they employ highly educated people, 
and they have had to rely more heavily on 
expensive technology to provide an up-to-
date education.
 Third, the idea that administrative 
bloat is a major cost driver warrants a close 
look and a bit of context. The percentage 
of the university work force classified as 
administrators and support staff, as opposed 
to clerical workers or instructional staff, 
has indeed grown. According to the Center 
for College Affordability and Productivity, 
the past 20 years have seen a doubling of 
support staff while student enrollment has 
grown by only 40 percent.4 If this shift in 
the proportions of the college work force 
did not provide value, or if it was unusual 
among other major industries, we might 
have cause to look for waste. But this 
shift away from production and clerical 
workers toward professional staff is a 
nationwide phenomenon. In part, it reflects 
a longstanding global trend toward more 
intensive use of educated professional and 
technical workers, who accounted for less 
than 14 percent of the nation’s total labor 
force in 1970, but almost 25 percent in 2008.5
 Lastly, our story of rising college cost 
fits a series of related industries, all of which 
have been buffeted 
by the same 
economic stresses. 
The dysfunction 
narrative focuses 
exclusively on 
what is going on 
inside the higher 
education system. 
If dysfunction in 
higher education 
is the primary 
driver of cost over 
long stretches 
of time, then the 
similarity between 
the experience of higher education and 
other industries must be an interesting 
coincidence. 
The Role of Subsidies 
Increasing costs are clearly a very important 
part of the explanation of rising tuition. To 
use an anatomy metaphor, cost forms the 
skeleton. In most industries, this skeleton 
is almost the whole story—price equals cost 
plus a profit margin. Over time, competition 
limits this profit margin so price usually 
tracks cost quite closely. Higher education, 
however, is different. 
 Since the founding of the first college, 
not-for-profit higher education has been a 
highly subsidized activity. The subsidies 
come from many sources: endowment 
earnings, gifts, private and government 
grants, and government appropriations. As 
a result almost all students pay much less 
than the full costs of their education—even 
those who may be paying full tuition. Many 
students receive scholarships and grants 
that reduce the price they have to pay. 
As a result 
almost all students 
pay much less than the full 
costs of their education—
even those who may be 
paying full tuition.
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 The amount of the subsidy and its 
sources are changing, and this has had a 
profound effect on what colleges charge. 
Figure D divides spending on higher 
education among the federal government, 
state and local governments, and families.6 
Between the late 1950s and late 1970s, 
governments assumed a larger share of the 
financing burden. But since 1980, when the 
family share was 30 percent, the states have 
gradually ratcheted down their support 
of higher education. As a consequence, 
families have borne an increasing fraction 
of a rising tuition bill. This is a problem that 
has fallen largely on those who attend public 
colleges and universities. 
 Most of the subsidy received by public 
universities comes as a direct appropriation 
from the state. Schools have a target amount 
of spending needed to produce the quality of 
programming they intend to offer. In simple 
terms, a school then sets average tuition 
by subtracting the per-student institutional 
subsidy from the planned level of per-
student spending. If the state appropriation 
is cut, schools face a hard choice. They 
can raise tuition to preserve quality, trim 
spending despite the negative effects this 
may have on student learning as well as 
on retention and graduation rates, or limit 
admission slots. As a result, rising tuition 
may result from sustained cuts in subsidy, 
independent of any pressure from costs. 
 The decided downward slope of 
the line designating state and local 
government’s share of spending on higher 
education is the result of state and local 
appropriations to colleges and universities 
not keeping up with inflation or with the 
growth in the number of students seeking 
postsecondary education. Real state and 
local appropriations per full-time equivalent 
student in the 2008–09 academic year were 
only 78.5 percent of what they had been in 
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the 1990–91 academic year.7 Although this 
reallocation of state spending away from 
higher education is a long-term trend, the 
data are punctuated by recessions in which 
state finances, which are subject to balanced 
budget constraints, undergo substantial 
retrenchment. Without federal help in the 
recent recession, the effect of state cuts for 
higher education would have been far worse.
 This ratcheting down of state support 
for higher education has consequences. 
Although we are not fans of college 
rankings, a 25-year evolution within one 
ranking system shows the effects of starving 
public higher education. In the inaugural 
edition of the US News & World Report 
college rankings that came out in 1987, 
eight public universities were in the top 25 
national universities. Two were in the top 10. 
In the most recent evaluation there are none 
in the top 20 and only two, at 21st and 25th, 
in the elite 25. 
 While some private universities receive 
state and local appropriations, endowment 
earnings and private 
gifts dominate 
institutional 
subsidies in the 
private sector. 
This too makes 
institutional 
subsidies 
susceptible to 
the whims of 
the national 
economy. When 
the economy and 
the stock market 
are booming, endowment earnings grow 
and donors become more generous, but 
when the economy and the stock market 
experience difficulties, private institutions 
will also suffer.
 Lastly, institutional subsidies vary 
dramatically among institutions. There are 
some well-endowed private institutions 
whose students’ tuition covers only a small 
share of the costs of their education. There 
are also some private institutions that have 
to charge their students almost the entire 
cost. Similarly, there are some states that 
provide very generous appropriations to 
their institutions and others that provide 
very meager subsidies. 
Tuition Discounting
The list price tuition published in the 
university catalogue does not tell you what 
the average student actually pays. This is 
because schools routinely discount the list 
price for many students. If a school offered 
no discounts, its list price tuition could 
be set lower. But if it offered no discounts, 
the characteristics of the student body 
would differ.
 Tuition discounting is not new, but for 
a variety of reasons the size of the average 
discount has grown at both public and 
private universities over the past 25 years. 
This growing use of discounting is part 
of the reason for 
rapidly rising list 
price tuition in 
recent years. 
 Tuition 
discounting serves 
several purposes. 
Some of the 
scholarships and 
grants are designed 
to overcome low 
ability to pay. Other 
scholarships and 
grants are designed 
to attract students with particular attributes 
and talents. In both cases, discounting is 
a tool that helps schools craft the “right” 
freshman class while also generating the 
revenues needed to run the kind of program 
the school wishes to offer. 
 What explains the increasing use of 
tuition discounts? One argument is that 
Without federal help 
in the recent recession, 
the effect of state cuts 
for higher education would 
have been far worse
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rising discount rates reflect the prestige 
games infecting higher education. While 
we are skeptical that prestige games play 
a significant role in explaining increases 
in college costs, an arms race story about 
merit aid is more compelling. Clearly there 
are a large number of institutions that use 
tuition discounts to 
try to lure students 
with high SATs, 
or a good jump 
shot, or leadership 
potential, or some 
other desirable 
characteristic. Also, 
there are some 
institutions further 
down the pecking 
order that use 
tuition discounts in 
an attempt simply 
to “make their 
freshman class.” 
 These tuition 
discounts are based on student merit, 
broadly defined. Merit discounts are not 
free, and they may actually reduce access 
if they push up list price and discourage 
some students from considering college as 
an option. On the other hand, merit grants 
are also a tool to enrich a class in ways that 
benefit all students in the class. 
 However, a significant portion of tuition 
discounting is based on student need. In a 
2006 report for the College Board, Sandy 
Baum and Lucie Lapovsky designated a 
tuition discount as need-based if it met 
traditionally defined need regardless of the 
motivation for the grant. Using this broad 
definition of need-based aid, they found 
that between 2000–01 and 2004–05 roughly 
70 percent of tuition discounts at private 
four-year colleges and universities were 
need-based and slightly less than 50 percent 
of tuition discounts at public flagship 
institutions were need-based. 
 Increases in tuition discounts come 
either from the competition for students 
among schools heating up or from greater 
disparities between the ability of the 
families to pay and the tuition charged by 
institutions. Both of these factors are at 
work. Again the overall state of the economy 
is going to have 
a large effect. As 
family incomes have 
stagnated over the 
past decade, schools 
have had to increase 
tuition discounting 
to retain a 
socioeconomically 
diverse student 
body. The attempt 
to maintain 
economic diversity 
pushes up list price 
tuition, and this is 
not a bad thing.
Federal and State Aid
Some students receive direct subsidies from 
federal government grants, privately funded 
grants, state funded grants, or endowment-
funded scholarships. Also, some tuition 
charges are tax deductible or can be used 
as credits against tax liability. A part of the 
tuition charged to these students will be 
paid from their grants or scholarships or 
by the federal government in reduced tax 
liability. This does not necessarily affect 
pricing. The institution does not care who 
pays the bill. These grants, scholarships, 
and tax advantages are very important 
to the students and families involved. In 
2008–09 the total discount rate, including 
scholarships and grants from all sources, was 
40.8 percent at private four-year schools and 
43.8 percent at public four-year schools.8
 The federal government’s Pell Grant 
Program is a major source of outside financial 
aid. As we said, this aid does not necessarily 
This aid does not 
necessarily have any 
direct effect on the tuition 
charged, but federal 
subsidies of this sort are 
quite controversial.
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have any direct effect on the tuition charged, 
but federal subsidies of this sort are quite 
controversial. To some detractors, federal 
student aid drives demand and pushes up 
tuition prices. They argue that expanded 
availability of federal financial aid gave 
colleges room to raise prices. 
 This argument suffers from two flaws. 
First, the notion that increased demand 
raises price is based on a simple supply 
and demand framework in which rising 
demand moves along an upward sloping 
supply curve, yielding a higher price. Most 
of the empirical work on the market supply 
response to changing demand suggests that 
the national supply of seats in college is very 
flexible over time. Rising demand translates 
into more seats made available, not more 
tuition. Colleges and universities can add 
students without increasing average costs.
 Our own research uses statistical 
causality tests to evaluate the claim that 
federal aid drives tuition prices.9 We find that 
increased federal support is indeed causally 
related to tuition, but not in the direction 
predicted. We found that increases in the 
maximum Pell Grant caused private four-
year institutions to decrease tuition. Our 
result suggests that increased Pell Grant 
support leaves less unmet financial need in 
the student body, and this reduces pressure 
on schools to offer tuition discounts based 
on need. This decreased pressure to offer 
discounts slows the rate of growth of list 
price tuition. 
College Affordability 
The term “affordability” is one of the most 
misunderstood and misused words in the 
higher education debate. To many observers, 
rising tuition alone is synonymous with 
reduced affordability. This ignores the fact 
that productivity growth over the past 40 
years has caused a doubling of per capita real 
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income in the United States. College tuition 
has indeed taken a rising share of the average 
family’s budget, but so have most services. 
This is what happens when measured 
productivity growth is concentrated in 
some sectors, like 
manufacturing 
and other goods 
industries, but not 
others (such as most 
personal services). 
 The right way 
to think about 
affordability is to 
ask the following 
question: Over 
any given span of 
years, once you 
account for all price 
changes and all changes in family income, 
can a family purchase the exact same set of 
goods and services as before, and have more 
money left over to buy other things? If so, 
then no one is “forced” to drop out of college 
or to trade down to lower-priced educational 
alternatives. They may choose to attend 
different types of schools as the relative 
price of public versus private education 
changes, or as college tuition rises relative 
to automobiles or televisions. But if you can 
purchase the exact same basket of goods and 
services and then some, you are better off.
 Despite the rising real cost of 
attendance, when you factor in all the grant 
aid and tuition discounts that families with 
different incomes could obtain, a year in 
college did not become less affordable 
for the median family between the 1970s 
and the early 2000s. The only group that 
experienced affordability problems was the 
poorest 20 percent of the population trying 
to attend private four-year institutions. 
Family incomes were rising rapidly enough 
to permit most families to pay the rising 
price of college, and the rising cost of other 
things, with more left over. 
 This has changed over the past decade. 
With the exception of the super-rich, college 
affordability has diminished over the last 10 
years. To understand why this has happened 
we have to look at the evolution of the 
income distribution 
in the United States 
over the past half-
century. Figure E 
tells the story of how 
real family income 
has changed, 
broken down by 
income quintiles. 
We also add the 
95th percentile to 
see how people in 
the top 5 percent 
have fared.10 The 
diagram tells a story that is increasingly well-
known. Real family income for families in the 
bottom half of the income distribution has 
been roughly stagnant for a long time. There 
is some real income growth for families at 
the 60th percentile and considerable real 
income growth for higher income families. 
Perhaps the most striking thing about this 
graph is the fact that real income growth 
seems to have stopped for all of these 
income groups starting in roughly 2000. 
 The fact that real family income has been 
flat, including at the rarified 95th percentile 
of the income distribution, means that college 
has become increasingly less affordable 
for almost everyone starting in 2000. Over 
longer time horizons, the story is different, but 
what most families know is their most recent 
history and this is what has motivated much 
of the “affordability crisis” talk. 
 Stagnant real income growth across 
income groups poses a significant challenge 
to governments and to higher education 
institutions. In the past, the federal 
government and institutions could focus 
much of their effort on access for needy 
students. The Pell Grant Program and 
Real family income for 
families in the bottom half 
of the income distribution 
has been roughly stagnant 
for a long time. 
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need-based tuition discounting moderated 
the effect of stagnant real income growth for 
these families. The costs of this approach 
were passed on to taxpayers and students 
from higher income families who could 
still easily afford increases in the cost of 
attending college out of their growing 
incomes. This model no longer works as 
there are few families capable of financing 
the system without feeling real pain. 
 The causes of stagnant income growth 
that drive recent decreases in college 
affordability are not well understood. Clearly 
part of the story is that the economic growth 
we have experienced in the 2000s has not 
been shared as it was in the past. From 
1947–73, productivity grew by 2.8 percent a 
year and real hourly compensation grew by 
2.6 percent a year. The bulk of the national 
productivity growth that drove average 
living standards higher was passed on to 
workers in the form of increased wages. 
From 2000–09, productivity grew at an 
annual rate of 2.5 percent, which is quite 
close to the 1947–73 figure, but real hourly 
compensation only grew by 1.1 percent. 
Between 2000–09 only 44 percent of the 
productivity growth was passed on to 
workers.11 This is a 
dramatic shift, and 
it has had profound 
effects on the 
country’s income 
distribution.
 This change 
in the way national 
income is allocated 
is a driving force 
behind the current 
clamor about 
college affordability. 
If the benefits of productivity growth had 
been shared the way they had been in 
the past, the redistribution inherent in a 
high-tuition, high-aid model could have 
continued with little concern. 
 Thus the system is under strain, and it 
comes from several sources. First, we have 
the profound changes in the way the benefits 
of growth are shared in our economy. 
Second, political decisions to reduce 
government subsidies to public institutions 
have shifted more responsibility for paying 
for higher education onto families. Third, 
forces we have discussed above push up 
higher education costs. Absent sustained 
productivity growth, higher education 
cannot suspend price increases without 
diminishing quality. The college affordability 
problem is not simple, and there are no 
simple solutions. 
Recap and Recommendations
The United States is no longer the leading 
producer of college graduates. According to 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, in 2009 the United States 
was 16th in a ranking of countries by the 
fraction of the female population holding a 
college degree, and 15th in a ranking by the 
fraction of the male population holding a 
college degree.12 This is a worrisome trend 
given the large gaps in average earnings 
and in unemployment rates between people 
who hold a college 
degree and people 
whose training 
stopped with high 
school. The link 
between education 
and innovation 
should induce us to 
seek ways to raise 
the fraction of our 
population that 
receives a higher 
education simply 
because it’s a good investment in the future. 
The White House has pledged to restore US 
primacy in higher education attainment, but 
the challenge is daunting.
The college affordability 
problem is not simple, 
and there are no 
simple solutions. 
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 Most of us who study higher education 
can agree on a number of things. First, 
maintaining and improving access to high-
quality programming is a desirable social 
goal. Access to higher education remains 
the ticket to the 21st century job market. To 
increase the fraction of the population that 
completes a college degree program we 
must have reasonably open access to the 
system regardless of income. If economic 
constraints chop off the socioeconomically 
disadvantaged 
segment of the 
population, we 
cannot hope to 
increase the fraction 
of the nation’s labor 
force that holds 
a college degree. 
Students from the 
middle and upper 
income segment 
of the population 
already graduate at 
very high rates. The 
room for significant 
improvement is in 
the lower half of the 
income distribution. 
 Second, affordability is a problem for 
many families who are not poor, and over 
the last 10 years this problem has crept up 
the income ladder, increasing the political 
traction of the affordability issue. 
 Next, state funding for public higher 
education is unlikely to return to the more 
generous levels of the 1970s, and this 
compounds the affordability problem. Given 
the pressures of everything from health care 
mandates and K–12 spending to the costs 
of prisons and roads, this reprioritization 
of state finances seems permanent. Public 
institutions must adjust to the new reality. 
In the future, public higher education will be 
more tuition-driven than in the past.
 Lastly, cost containment in higher 
education requires meaningful productivity 
improvements that maintain or improve 
educational outcomes. Mere cost 
cutting without regard to quality is not a 
productivity gain.
 The policy choices we make to help us 
achieve these goals are crucial, and here is 
where fundamental differences arise. People 
who think about higher education within the 
dysfunction narrative come to very different 
conclusions from 
those who take a 
broader approach 
to explaining and 
contextualizing the 
trajectory of college 
cost. 
If colleges 
and universities 
are increasingly 
inefficient 
enterprises, the 
remedy is to change 
the incentives 
that produce the 
inefficiency or to 
directly regulate 
pricing and 
other university choices. But the federal 
government has few levers to pull that 
directly affect how schools behave, so policy 
proposals based on the dysfunction narrative 
tend to be rules-based and punitive. In 
general, we think this approach to policy-
making overestimates what government 
can accomplish and oversimplifies the real 
problems we face in achieving generally 
agreed upon goals. 
 Simplistic rules such as price controls 
suffer from many defects. They frequently 
address symptoms instead of causes, and 
they often cannot distinguish between good 
behavior and bad behavior. A school that 
increased its discount rate in order to attract 
lower income students would have to push 
To increase the fraction 
of the population that 
completes a college 
degree program we must 
have reasonably open 
access to the system 
regardless of income.
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up its list price to preserve revenue. A school 
like this might run afoul of price controls 
and face sanctions for actually trying to 
improve access for lower income students. 
A public university that lost substantial 
state support might be faced with a choice 
of raising list price to minimize lost 
revenue or letting the quality of its program 
decline. Any simple rule or price control 
is likely to generate perverse unintended 
consequences . 
 Rules-based regulatory approaches are 
unlikely to improve access, make college 
more affordable, or transform productivity in 
the higher education industry. But there are 
more modest and targeted policy options 
that can help. 
 Our need-based financial aid system 
is needlessly complex. The main federal 
program for making a college education 
more affordable for millions of American 
students is the Pell Grant. But if you ask 
people to explain how the Pell Grant 
Program works, most will be unable to 
answer very clearly. To qualify for aid, 
families must fill out complex financial 
disclosure forms, and they often have no 
clear idea what a year at any particular 
college will cost until they are almost at the 
end of the long 
six-month college 
application process. 
This uncertainty is 
an economic barrier 
that induces many 
families to think 
that postsecondary 
education is simply 
unattainable for 
them. 
 There are a number of good proposals 
to simplify our aid programs, however we 
will not delve into any detail here. But aid 
simplification is one meaningful step we 
can take to begin changing the incentives of 
families early enough for them to make the 
set of decisions that lead their children onto 
the path of college preparatory training.
 The Holy Grail of higher education 
reform is productivity growth of the sort that 
has revolutionized manufacturing over the 
last century. Some argue this future is upon 
us in the form of distance education. Distance 
education is indeed an increasing component 
of coursework at many institutions, and 
its impact is controversial and not fully 
understood. There is an ongoing debate 
about whether or not this is a truly disruptive 
technology that will fundamentally change 
teaching and learning. 
 Some courses lend themselves to the 
distance education model. These courses 
involve relatively static knowledge that 
needs to be imparted to large groups of 
students each year, and situations in which 
the assessment of student learning can be 
easily automated. For undergraduate courses 
of this sort, we are already well down the 
path of exploring the cost-benefit tradeoff. In 
other situations, course material may evolve 
too fast or good learning and assessment 
may require small-group interaction, 
discussions, and intensive writing. In these 
cases the artisan model may offer much 
better outcomes.
We view 
distance learning, 
and other creative 
uses of digital 
media, as another 
incremental tool to 
change, improve, 
and perhaps 
modestly lower 
the cost of higher 
education. Its utility 
and best uses will be discerned over time 
by years of experimentation and testing in 
different settings.
Simplistic rules 
such as price controls 
suffer from many defects.
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Final Thoughts
The American higher education system 
has evolved over more than a century 
to meet a wide variety of social needs, 
including undergraduate teaching, graduate 
and professional 
training, basic 
research, and public 
service. It is a 
system under stress. 
But the economic 
and political forces 
that are tugging at 
it also affect many 
other parts of the 
economy. This is 
the context that is 
often missing from 
the debate, and our 
work is an attempt 
to fill in that blank.
 Our story 
about rising college 
cost lacks villains, and we see no simple 
policy remedies to reduce cost that would 
not also reduce quality or ration access. 
We see the forces for positive change as 
incremental, and arising from within as 
colleges grapple with their own needs. The 
other factors driving college tuition also 
reflect large political and economic changes 
as states grapple with budget difficulties 
and the country deals with the effects of a 
more unequal distribution of income and 
wealth. Making college more affordable is 
largely contingent on softening the impact 
of these larger 
issues. There are 
indeed problems in 
American higher 
education that 
can be remedied 
by specific policy 
changes. Our 
complex financial 
aid system is a 
real barrier to 
increasing the 
numbers of college-
qualified students 
who benefit from 
advanced training. 
And the financing 
compact between 
public universities and the states is badly 
in need of a rewriting. Public universities 
need to escape the budget roller coaster 
that disadvantages them compared to their 
private counterparts. But the first step on 
the path of wisdom is to ratchet down the 
overheated rhetoric of crisis and fix what can 
be fixed.
Our story about 
rising college cost lacks 
villains, and we see no 
simple policy remedies 
to reduce cost that would 
not also reduce quality or 
ration access. 
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